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THE NATURALISMS OF HUME AND REID*
1.  SOME PUZZLES
Consider the following picture in the rough.  Some beliefs arise from our very constitution,
from instinct; these beliefs, often irresistible, are justified even in the absence of arguments or
reasons in their behalf.  I think it fair to say that Thomas Reid, on the received view of his
philosophy, held a position of this sort; when Reid defended the legitimacy of the beliefs of
“common sense,” he had in view beliefs resulting from unavoidable and universal instinctive
mechanisms, the faculties associated with his “first principles.”  I think it also fair to say that
David Hume, on what is today the received interpretation of his philosophy, held a position of this
sort.  In his 1905 articles “The Naturalism of Hume,” Norman Kemp Smith introduced the term
‘natural beliefs’ as a label for irresistible, instinctive beliefs, arising from “the particular fabric and
constitution of the human species,” in Hume’s system.  Kemp Smith consolidated his account in
his 1941 book; his naturalistic interpretation has been the dominant force in the Hume literature
ever since.
But wait.  Reid was one of Hume’s severest critics, and advanced his theory of common sense
beliefs as a constructive response to Hume’s skepticism.  If the received interpretations of Hume
and Reid, respectively, are so much as on the right track, Hume himself had proposed a constructive
alternative to skepticism, one that downgrades the role of argument, emphasizing in its place the
irresistibility of instinctive beliefs that originate in human nature.  Common sense in Reid and
natural belief in Hume seem very much of a piece.  If so, what are we to make of Reid’s own
conception of his relationship to Hume?  It might seem that Reid either was deeply confused in this
regard, or badly misread Hume, or both.
Is it at all plausible that Reid could have misread Hume?  The Treatise presents severe
difficulties for any interpreter.  A work of apparently conflicting strands – at once empiricist,
skeptical, and naturalistic –, there is the problem of seeing how they fit together.  Add to this that
Hume scatters his most suggestive epistemological remarks, which are often incidental to one or
another associationist or psychological discussion.  Beyond these factors, the interpretation Kemp
Smith attacked, the Reid-Beattie interpretation, originated in Hume’s own time.  Hume parades
reductive metaphysical doctrines – about body, the mind, personal identity, and necessary
connection.  He denies the necessity of the principle that every new existent or modification of
existence has a cause.  Late eighteenth century figures regarded these positions as “skeptical.”
Hume seeks to demolish the argument from design and the possibility of testimonial evidence for
miracles.  Whereas twentieth century positivist readers welcomed Hume’s attacks on metaphysics, a
substantial self or soul, and arguments for God, Hume’s applications of his doctrines to religion
were a call to arms for his contemporaries.
What is more, Reid’s arsenal included a large-scale historical theory, of which Hume was but
a part.  In Reid’s figure-by-figure survey of “the way of ideas” and related views, the chapter on
Hume is shorter than those on Arnauld and Leibniz, and far shorter than those on Malebranche,
Descartes, Locke, and especially Berkeley, who receives the longest discussion by a good margin.
Although he reads stretches of Hume with care, Reid was not engaged in sympathetic interpretation.
His investment in the story of the Cartesian or common way of ideas could easily have led him to
distort Hume’s views, if not by misconstruing particular passages, by reading Hume selectively.  As
a general rule, commentators on Reid have found it convenient to adopt his conception of Hume’s
philosophy.  This is understandable, where the project is to consider Reid’s historical position
through his own eyes.  Yet, an investigation of how Reid could misinterpret Hume might yield
additional insight.
                                                
* This shortened version of the 2006-07 Patrick Romanell Lecture appears in MPN with the kind
permission of the American Philosophical Association.  The full paper, including additional
references to primary sources and footnotes, appears in the Proceedings and Addresses of the APA,
Vol. 81, No. 2 (November, 2007).
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2.  INDUCTION AND MEMORY
One entrée into Reid’s affinity with Hume is by way of their treatments of induction.  Reid,
unlike Hume, frequently uses ‘induction’ and ‘inductive’, and appeals to an “inductive principle”
(IHM 198, 199, 200).  Hume writes of inference or reasoning about causes and effects, and tends to
assimilate inductive inference to causal inference.  This opened the door to one of Reid’s criticisms
of Hume on causation, that night following day, though inductively supported, is not genuinely
causal (EIP 87).  There is another difference: Reid conceives regularities as a language of nature,
where the conjoined objects are signs of one another (IHM 190, 196, 200).  It remains that both
figures discuss a principle of the uniformity of nature, variously described, with Reid at times
adopting Hume’s first Enquiry formulation (EHU 37) in terms of the future resembling the past
(IHM 196).  Both are sensitive to a distinction between accidental and nonaccidental regularities
(THN 4, 104-5, 146-50, 175; and IHM 41, 199-200; EIP 350, 374, 561). Both investigate the
epistemology of induction.  I distinguish three prongs in Reid’s views on this topic.
First, Reid takes it that the inductive principle, the belief in “the continuance of the present
course of nature” (IHM 196), cannot be founded in argument or derived from antecedent reasoning
(IHM 196, 198; EIP 490).  This claim is basic Humean doctrine.  In section IV of the first Enquiry,
and in Treatise I.iii.6, Hume famously advances a “negative argument” (EHU 34), that inductive
inference cannot be founded either on demonstrative or probable argument.  Reid thus credited
Hume with showing that induction “is not grounded upon any antecedent reasoning” (EIP 490),
not “founded either upon knowledge or probability” (IHM 197).
Second, Reid attributes inductive beliefs to human nature – “the principle [that the future will
be like the past] . . . is made a part of our constitution” (EIP 489); “It is an instinctive prescience
of the operations of nature” (IHM 198).  This instinctive principle is “universal among mankind”
(EIP 490).  Of course, we do not believe that fire will be followed by smoke, absent relevant
experience.  Particular inductive beliefs are “the result of experience and habit” (IHM 38).
Presumably, some applications of the inductive principle, as with other common sense beliefs (cf.
IHM 172 and EIP 42, 96, 99, 264, 514-15, 551), are irresistible.  Similarly, “we are under a
necessity of assenting to [first principles]” (IHM 71), which are “necessary for our subsistence
and preservation” (EIP 375).
These positive claims, as applied to induction, are also Humean doctrine.  Inductive inference
is due to custom or habit, an instinctive principle.  Hume declares in the Treatise, with inference
based on custom in view, that “reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our
souls” (THN 179).  This passage and related texts lie at the core of Kemp Smith interpretation.
Further, in Treatise I.iii.13, the operation of custom “cannot be prevented by [reflection]” (THN
147).  In I.iv.4, causal inference founded in custom is Hume’s example of “principles which are
permanent, irresistable, and universal,” “unavoidable to mankind” (THN 225).  These principles
“are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must
immediately perish and go to ruin”; they are, as with Reid, “necessary . . . in the conduct of life”
(THN 225 – cf. EHU 108).  The emphasis on such features as irresistibility, taken to be the effects
of a universal, unavoidable instinct, the constitution of human nature, are to be found in Reid and
Hume alike.
It is worth pausing to consider whether Reid was aware of these common, constructive
doctrines.  It is surprisingly difficult to show that he was.  One might think that Reid could hardly
have missed these points in Hume.  The arrangement of the Treatise is relevant here.  Hume’s
explicit statements that causal inference is instinctive and irresistible appear in I.iii.16 (THN 179)
and I.iv.4 (THN 225).  Reid never cites these sections, which are far removed from the negative
argument of I.iii.6.  I do not find passages where Reid recognizes the irresistibility of inductive
beliefs in Hume.  Beginning with the discussion of custom and repetition in I.iii.8, Hume implicitly
develops an associationist explanation of the irresistibility of those causal inferences that amount to
proofs, because based on perfect habits.  The sections on probability – I.iii.11-13 – consolidate
Hume’s position.  (See, for example, THN 124, 130-31, 134-35, 142-143, 147, 153-54.)  Reid does
not refer to Hume’s views in this stretch of Part iii.  Since Reid had no patience for Hume’s
associationism, he might not have tracked this line of argument.  (In § 5, I revisit the question of
Reid’s recognition of irresistibility in Hume.)
“The Naturalisms of Hume and Reid”                                                                                  page 3
I turn to the third element in Reid’s views on induction.  When Reid writes that the belief in
the continuance of nature is a “first principle, in the sense in which I use that word” (EIP 490), he
is making the epistemic claim that inductive beliefs are evident and at least probable.  We
“distinguish evidence into different kinds” (EIP 229) corresponding to the different first
principles, though the evidence they provide is a matter of degree (cf. EIP 228, 456, 481).  Inductive
inference provides evidence, but cannot be founded in argument; its justification must be traced to
the fact that it results from a universal, unavoidable, instinctive principle.  For Reid, the negative
claim that the inductive principle is not founded in argument does not impugn the epistemic
credentials of inductive belief.
Does Reid diverge from Hume at this juncture?  He does, if the skeptical interpretation of
Hume on induction is correct.  This interpretation locates skepticism in the negative argument of
Treatise I.iii.6 and Enquiry IV: Hume maintains that inductive inference is not justified because it
cannot be supported by (non-question-begging) argument.  On the opposing Kemp Smith
interpretation, custom is a source of approved, “natural” beliefs.  Much Hume scholarship since
the 1940’s has been given over to a struggle between skeptical and naturalistic interpretations, with
Hume’s position on induction a main front.  Literature in the 1970’s and 80’s established the non-
skeptical reading as decisively as possible in the face of complex textual data.
Consider the Treatise, beginning with the context for the negative argument in I.iii.6.  As early
as I.iii.2 and I.iii.4, Hume advances a causal theory of reasoning about the unobserved: “the mind
in its reasonings from causes or effects carries its view beyond those objects, which it sees or
remembers” (THN 82 – cf. EHU 26, 146).  In I.iii.6, Hume examines “the nature of [the]
inference” (THN 88 – cf. EHU 32) from what we sense or remember to an unobserved cause or
effect.  Hume writes within the course of the negative argument itself: “cause and effect . . . ’tis the
only [connexion or relation of objects], on which we can found a just inference from one object to
another” (THN 89).  Though Hume finds that the inference is not founded in argument, his
commitment to causal inference survives unscathed.  Early in I.iii.8, he attributes causal inference to
custom (THN 102-3 – cf. EHU 43).  Later in the section, a person who stops his journey at a
riverbank “foresees the consequences of his proceeding forward; and his knowledge of these
consequences is convey’d to him by past experience” (THN 103, emphasis added).  In I.iii.9, the
discussion of the two systems of beliefs or “realities” (THN 108, Hume’s emphasis) constitutes
an extended restatement of the causal theory of knowledge.  Hume writes that “The first of these
systems is the object of the memory and senses” (THN 108).  The second system of beliefs is
“connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause or effect” (THN 108); “’Tis this
latter principle, which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their
removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory” (THN 108, emphasis
added – cf. EHU 55).
In addition, the skeptical problem of induction implies that all inductive inferences are on a
par, equally without justification.  Even so, in I.iii.11, some causal inferences, for example inference
to the belief that the sun will rise, constitute “proofs” (THN 124).  In I.iii.12, Hume provides an
inventory of “degree[s] of evidence” (THN 153 – cf. 130-31 and EHU 110, 117) that includes
proofs and also probability, good inductive arguments that fall short of proofs (THN 130-31, 142 –
cf. EHU 56-59).  In I.iii.13, Hume contrasts “unphilosophical probability” (THN 143) with
beliefs legitimately based on the senses, memory, and causal inference; within this section, some
causal inferences are “just and conclusive” (THN 144).  In I.iii.15, Hume provides eight “Rules
by which to judge of causes and effects,” “all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my
reasoning” (THN 175).  There is no accounting for this extensive textual data on the hypothesis
that Hume is a skeptic about induction.
Reid quotes the Treatise in some two dozen contexts in the Essays on the Intellectual Powers
of Man – but never any section of Part iii later than I.iii.7.  Reid does not discuss or allude to the
foreknowledge in the riverbank passage in I.iii.8, the two systems of realities in I.iii.9, the admission
of inductive proofs in I.iii.11, the degrees of inductive evidence in I.iii.12, the distinction between
philosophical and unphilosophical probability in I.iii.13, or the rules to judge of causes and effects
in I.iii.15.  (Reid endorses Newtonian, methodological rules – without mentioning Hume’s rules –
as “maxims of commons sense” at IHM 12.)  Nor does Reid take up a now famous passage in
I.iv.4: “One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the dark,
reasons justly and naturally; tho’ that conclusion be deriv’d from nothing but custom” (THN 225).
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This in the paragraph that cites causal inference as an example of the “permanent, irresistable, and
universal” principles of the imagination.
How could it be that Hume’s epistemic endorsements of causal inference withstand his
negative claim that induction is not founded in argument?  In the Enquiry as well as the Treatise,
Hume’s approval of causal inference is in place prior to the negative argument.  In both works,
Hume interposes the claim that causal inference is due to custom, to instinct, after the negative
argument and before numerous expressions of his continuing commitment to the positive epistemic
status of causal inference.  The obvious interpretive hypothesis is that Hume’s view is akin to
Reid’s: causal inference, albeit not founded on argument, is justified, with its justification tracing to
features of custom’s operation or origin in human nature.  Kemp Smith’s work identified the
irresistible and instinctual character of custom as a salient candidate for playing this role in Hume’s
epistemology.
It is instructive to consider Reid’s treatment of Hume on memory against this background.
Reid is confident that the way of ideas leads to skepticism about the past: “For since ideas are
things present, how can we, from our having a certain idea presently in our mind, conclude that an
event really happened ten or twenty years ago corresponding to it?” (EIP 290).  Reid attributes this
worry to Hume: “It does not appear to have occurred either to Locke or to Berkeley, that their
system has the same tendency to overturn the testimony of memory as the testimony of the senses.
Mr. Hume saw further than both” (EIP 290).  In another passage, Reid is more circumspect: “Mr.
Hume has not, as far as I remember, directly called in question the testimony of memory; but he has
laid down the premises by which its authority is overturned, leaving it to his reader to draw the
conclusion” (EIP 475).  Hume never does call memory into question, though Reid does not pause
to ask why not.  The question is pressing, given Reid’s contention that Hume proceeds with the
“aim of establishing universal scepticism” (EIP 290).
Hume writes in Treatise I.iii.5: “it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the
original order and position of its ideas” (THN 85) – hardly skeptical in tone.  This should be
unsurprising.  The causal theory of knowledge of the unobserved emerges in I.iii.2 and I.iii.4.
Causal inference could not extend our knowledge beyond the observed unless the senses and
memory are sources of knowledge.  Hume’s causal theory of knowledge presupposes the positive
epistemic standing of memory.
Reid suggests that the way of ideas saddles Hume with the view that the evidence of memory
must be supported by argument (EIP 289-90, 475-76).  In fact, Hume, like Reid, gives an infinite
regress argument for basic beliefs, and for noninferential memory knowledge in particular (EIP
455):
When we infer effects from causes, we must establish the existence of these causes; which we have
only two ways of doing, either by an immediate perception of our memory or senses, or by an
inference from other causes . . . till we arrive at some object, which we see or remember.  ’Tis
impossible for us to carry on our inferences in infinitum; and the only thing, that can stop them,
is an impression of the memory or senses, beyond which there is no room for doubt or inquiry.
(THN 83).
There is no room for doubt about the existence of the object we remember because memory,
“recent and fresh” memory not yet subject to decay (THN 143-44), is irresistible.  Reid also
restricts the highest degree of “certainty and evidence” to cases where memory is “recent . . . and
fresh” (EIP 42).  Hume writes that demonstration is “irresistible” early in the Treatise (THN 31).
In the I.iii.13 survey of degrees of evidence, “force and . . . vivacity are most conspicuous in the
memory; and therefore our confidence in the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable, and
equals in many respects the assurance of a demonstration” (THN 153).  Causal inference
constitutes “[t]he next degree of these qualities” (THN 153), and is thus “irresistable” at I.iv.4.
The irresistibility of memory is essential to Hume’s psychological explanation of the
irresistibility of causal inference – this because the strength of a belief in an unobserved object is
transmitted from the strength of the belief of the senses or memory from which it is inferred.
When causal inference proceeds from a perfect habit – frequent observation of a constant
conjunction – the strength of an initial belief in an observed object is transferred nearly in its
entirety to the idea of the unobserved.  The resulting belief can be irresistible only if the initial belief
based on the senses or memory is irresistible.  These doctrines are set out in associationist terms –
where “vivacity” and “force” are identified with degree of confidence and assurance – in sections
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5, 6, 8, and 12 of Part iii of Book I.  (Reid of course rejects Hume’s associationist account of
memory – at IHM 28-29, 197-98 –, but the claim that memory is irresistible can be detached from
the associationism.)  For Hume as well as for Reid, belief based on memory is often irresistible, and
is a source of evidence and knowledge, even absent supporting argument.
3.  THE PROPER OBJECT OF EPISTEMOLOGY
The similarity of Reid’s and Hume’s views about memory and induction are symptomatic of
a deeper agreement about epistemology as an enterprise – less anachronistically, about one objective
of a theory of the human mind.  Reid’s criteria for discerning first principles include “the consent .
. . of the learned and unlearned” (EIP 464); beliefs about the unobserved held by both the “simple
rustic” and the philosopher “are built on the very same ground” (EIP 561).  It is also a mark of
first principles that beliefs “appear so early in the minds of men, that they cannot be the effect of
education, or of false reasoning” (EIP 467).  Thus, “children and idiots have [the] belief [that the
future will be like the past] as soon as they know that fire will burn them.  It must therefore be the
effect of instinct, not of reason” (IHM 196).  So too with animals; inductive inference “is the effect
of a principle of our nature, common to us with the brutes” (IHM 50).  Reid collates these points:
“The language of nature is the universal study; and the students are of different classes.  Brutes,
idiots, and children, employ themselves in this study” (IHM 200).  Similarly, “Perception . . .
implies no exercise of reason; and is common to men, children, idiots, and brutes” (IHM 173).
With respect to first principles, “There is no searching for evidence, no weighing of arguments; the
proposition is not deduced or inferred from another” (EIP 452) – not if we are to account for the
knowledge of children and animals.
All these themes appear in Hume.  In I.iv.2, Hume notes that “whatever convincing arguments
philosophers may fancy they can produce to establish the belief of objects independent of the mind,
’tis obvious these arguments are known but to very few, and that ’tis not by them, that children,
peasants, and the greatest part of mankind are induc’d” (THN 193) to believe in body.  He writes
in Treatise I.iii.16, “Of the reason of animals”:
Beasts . . . can never by any arguments form a general conclusion, that those objects, of which
they have had no experience, resemble those of which they have.  ’Tis therefore by means of
custom alone, that experience operates upon them.  All this was sufficiently evident with respect
to man.  But with respect to beasts there cannot be the least suspicion of mistake. (THN 178)
It was evident with respect to man, on two counts.  First, in I.iii.6, belief in uniformity cannot be
founded on argument.  Second, in I.iii.6 and I.iii.8, “custom operates before we have time for
reflexion,” without “a moment’s delay,” “without reflecting on it” (THN 104); “the imagination
of itself supplies the place of . . . reflection” (THN 93).  Hume observes:
When any hypothesis . . . is advanc’d to explain a mental operation, which is common to men and
beasts, we must apply the same hypothesis to both . . . The common defect of those systems,
which philosophers have employ’d to account for the actions of the mind, is, that they suppose
such a subtility and refinement of thought, as not only exceeds the capacity of mere animals, but
even of children and the common people in our own species. (THN 177)
Hume, like Reid, insists on the continuity in human and animal understanding.
This theme is prominent in three of the twelve sections of the first Enquiry, even though it is a
much truncated work.  (In the Treatise, Hume withholds discussion of the understanding of
animals until I.iii.16.)  Hume writes in the final paragraph of section IV: “It is certain that the most
ignorant and stupid peasants – nay infants, nay even brute beasts . . . expect a similar effect from a
cause, which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearances”; “this conclusion” does not arise
“by any process of argument” (EHU 39).  In the final paragraph of section V: “reason . . .
appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy”; causal inference results from “an
instinct” that “nature” has “implanted in us” (EHU 55).  Section IX, “Of the reason of
animals,” reiterates and consolidates these points:
It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or
reasoning . . . For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too abstruse
for the observation of such imperfect understandings . . . Animals, therefore, are not guided in
these inferences by reasoning: Neither are children: neither are the generality of mankind, in their
ordinary actions and conclusions. (EHU 106)
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Then, in the final paragraph of the section: “experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in
common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of
instinct” (EHU 108).
Reid does not cite or allude to either of Hume’s sections on the reason of animals.  Hume and
Reid nonetheless agree that an explanation of the knowledge of reflective adults must also explain
that of nonreflective adults, children, and brutes.  A number of basic cognitive processes – memory
and inductive inference among them – are common to humans and animals.  This constraint exerts
pressure in the direction of broadly externalist theories of knowledge.  Reid and Hume do not
merely maintain that we can have knowledge even though no argument is available; were argument
or reflection required, they both insist, we could not explain the knowledge of more humble
creatures.  Theories of empirical knowledge that demand even the capacity to produce arguments, to
elaborate reasons, are non-starters.  Classical foundationalist theories are ruled out of court.  (Hume
had targeted foundationalism, though Reid went about the critique more self-consciously and
systematically.)  The most obvious alternative is the class of externalist theories in which knowledge
is the result of the operation of belief-forming mechanisms that are suitably instinctual, or adaptive
and properly functioning, or reliable, and so forth.  Reid shows no recognition of this anti-
foundationalist alignment with Hume.
4.  EPISTEMIC REDUCTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION
Let me turn to some differences between the naturalisms of Reid and Hume, of interest in
themselves, and that might have contributed to Reid’s blind spot.  I have mentioned Hume’s
reductionism (§ 1).  Reid faults this tendency in Hume’s metaphysics, where “bodies . . . are
nothing but ideas in the mind,” and “what we call a mind is nothing but a train of ideas” (EIP
173).  Hume’s metaphysics is an offense to substance, but also to dualism.  In psychology, there is
Hume’s reduction of mental processes to association.  In epistemology, there is the reduction of
knowledge, beyond the senses and memory, to causal inference: “By means of [the] relation [of
cause and effect] alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses” (EHU 26 – cf.
THN 73-74).
Hume pursues the epistemic reduction in a variety of contexts.  For example, “our faith [in
human testimony] arises from the very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects, and
from effects to causes” (THN 113).  For Reid, “a disposition . . . to believe what [others] tell us”
is an “original principle” (IHM 194).  Or consider other minds.  In the Treatise, sympathy
converts a belief that another person is experiencing a specific feeling into the feeling itself (THN
316-20, 385-86).  How do we acquire the initial belief?  Hume writes that it is “the relation of cause
and effect, by which we are convinc’d of the reality of the passion, with which we sympathize”
(THN 320).  Causal inferences about the experiences of others, based on observed conjunctions in
one’s own case, are a precondition for the operation of sympathy.  (This is another juncture where
Hume is no skeptic about causal inference.)  For Reid, knowledge of the conscious states of others
depends upon “[a]nother first principle . . . , That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the
voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind” (EIP 484).
Similarly, the burden of Section XI of the first Enquiry is that any cogent argument from the order
in nature for the existence of God must be based on causal inference (EHU 135-36).  For Reid,
belief in a designing author of the universe relies neither on a general inductive principle, nor on the
first principles of contingent truths that apply to other minds.  He invokes an additional,
“metaphysical” (EIP 503) first principle, a “necessary truth” (EIP 507): “effects which have all
the marks and tokens of design must proceed from a designing cause” (EIP 507).  Though Reid
grants that “we ought not to multiply [original principles] without necessity,” he maintains that the
first principles “are more in number than is commonly thought” (EIP 349).  Reid does not find his
reliance on a good dozen first principles troubling (EIP 493).
In Reid’s view, “The evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the
necessary relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of evidence, equally grounded on
our constitution; none of them depends upon, or can be resolved into, another” (IHM 32).  This
generalizes: “I am not able to find any common nature to which [the different kinds of evidence]
may all be reduced” – except that “they are all fitted by Nature to produce belief in the human
mind” (EIP 229).  This is a stipulative claim about what is to count as a first principle.  Reid is
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open to the possibility that “we find some more general principle into which” a putative first
principle “may be resolved” (IHM 61).  Descartes’ and Locke’s attempts to identify a common
nature – clear and distinct perception, the perception of the agreement and disagreement of ideas –
are nevertheless wrongheaded (EIP 229).  Reid might have added to his list Hume’s reduction of
knowledge, beyond the senses and memory, to causal inference, had he recognized the program of
resolving all knowledge beyond the senses and memory into causal inference.
First principles cannot be resolved into one another epistemically.  Nor can they be explained
psychologically.  According to Reid, Hume is “far from conceiving [our belief in continuance] to
be an original principle of the mind” (IHM 197).  Reid’s ground for this claim is that Hume
“endeavours to account for [continuance] from his favourite hypothesis” (IHM 197); “by
[Hume’s] system, three laws of association, joined to a few original feelings, explain the whole
mechanism of sense, imagination, memory, belief” (IHM 22).  Reid is not merely objecting to
associationism; he insists that “[s]ensation and memory . . . are simple, original, and perfectly
distinct operations of the mind” (IHM 29).  Since such basic mental operations as memory and
belief are simple, they do not admit of definition or analysis (IHM 31).  Further, “no philosopher
can give a shadow of reason” why sensation and memory should compel belief, “but that such is
the nature of these operations” (IHM 28).  Here we encounter Reid’s theme, emphasized by
Nicholas Wolterstorff, of the darkness or mystery of the mind.  “In all our original faculties, the
fabric and manner of operation is . . . beyond our comprehension” (EIP 394).  In calling a
principle “original,” Reid often means not only that it is innate, but also “unaccountable” (IHM
41).  This perhaps got in the way of his acknowledging that custom in Hume functions as a first
principle in virtue of being instinctive and innate.
In claiming that psychological mechanisms are beyond our grasp, Reid might be calling
attention to the gulf between human and Divine understanding, or, as Wolterstorff suggests, to the
need for practical trust in our faculties.  My concern is with the claim’s importance to Reid in
supporting his proliferation of first principles.  In Book I, Hume applies a test of reflective approval
to the understanding.  Consider the belief in a substantial self or soul.  For Reid, this belief, arising
from a first principle, is unaccountable (EIP 472-74).  For Hume, the belief results from a multi-
stage psychological process.  We attribute strict identity to perceptions that, though variable and
interrupted, are resembling; this is a “confusion and mistake” (THN 254), rooted in a propensity
to confound resembling ideas and resembling mental dispositions (THN 253-54).  When we notice
the variation and interruption in the impressions, and thus recognize that they cannot be strictly the
same, we suppose or feign an unobservable soul as the locus of the strict identity that we had been
inclined to attribute to observable perceptions.  The supposition of a soul is a “fiction” that
functions to “disguise” the variation (THN 254).  Hume lays bare the operative psychological
mechanism and regards it as debunking.
Reid agrees that it would be disquieting, were Hume’s explanation of belief in the existence of
the mind correct.  Reid disparages the possibility that “those inferences which we draw from our
sensations, namely, the existence of a mind, and of powers or faculties belonging to it, are . . . mere
fictions of the mind, which a wise man should throw off as he does the belief of fairies” (IHM 37).
In the opening chapter of the Inquiry into the Human Mind, Reid complains:
[I]f [the mind] is indeed what [Hume] makes it, I find I have been only in an inchanted castle,
imposed upon by spectres and apparitions.  I blush inwardly to think how I have been deluded; I
am ashamed of my frame . . . O Nature, to put such tricks upon a silly creature, and then to take
off the mask, and shew him how he hath been befooled. (IHM 22).
Reid finds that Hume’s account of the principles of the mind wanting; they fail to win reflective
approval.  Reid’s resistance, however hard and fast, to the psychological investigation of first
principles forestalls subjecting his own account of the mind and its faculties to a similar test.  To the
extent that psychological mechanisms are opaque, they cannot be unmasked.  Reid forecloses any
appeal to empirical psychology to call the epistemic status of any of his first principles into
question.  This is a breach in his naturalism.
 There is a second way in which the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of the mind shelters
Reid’s multiplication of first principles.  Reid individuates first principles in terms of their inputs
and/or outputs – for example, perception of the countenance, voice, and gestures “in,” beliefs about
other minds “out.”  If  the operative mechanisms are for us a black box, empirical psychology is
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powerless to support a reduction by resolving one first principle into another.  Nor can we compare
mechanisms in order to spot ones that might strike us as outliers.
As it happens, Hume relaxes his reductionism in the Enquiries.  The Treatise’s associationist
explanation of sympathy gives way to humanity and fellow-feeling; “It is not probable, that these
principles can be resolved into principles more simple and universal” (EPM 219-20n.1).  The
Treatise’s multi-page associationist explanation of probabilistic inference (THN 127-30, 133-38)
gives way to beliefs that arise “immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature” (EHU 57).
The Treatise’s fifteen page explanation of why we believe in objects that have a continued and
independent existence (THN 194-210) – the discussion of coherence and constancy – also
collapses into a primitive instinct: “It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or
prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before
the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception”
(EHU 151).
This stunning turnaround sweeps away Hume’s attempt to ground the belief in body in causal
inference.  In explaining the belief in the Treatise, the only resources Hume allows himself are
beliefs about impressions.  He interprets the Part iii formula that all knowledge is based on “the
senses” (THN 73, 108), memory, and causal inference, to mean that all knowledge is based on
sense impressions, memory, and causal inference (THU 191, 193).  The inputs to causal inference
are beliefs, based on introspection or consciousness, about internal impressions, together with
beliefs based on memory about past impressions.  In cases of coherence – as in viewing a fire
burning down – impressions “have a regular dependence on each other” (THN 195); the belief in
body “arises . . . from custom in an indirect and oblique manner” (THN 197), and hence is due to
“a kind of reasoning from causation” (THN 195).  Hume’s epistemic reductionism is at work in
his treatment of coherence.  In the Enquiry, where there is no explanation of the belief in body,
constancy and coherence alike drop out of the picture.  The belief in body is an original,
unaccountable instinct, coordinate with – in no way reducible to – custom or causal inference.  This
could be Reid (cf. EIP 476-77).  Hume falls back, in Reid’s terminology, on first principles for
consciousness, memory, causal inference, and perception of body – thus taking a step in the
direction of Reid’s tolerance of multiple first principles.
Hume’s uncompromising reductionism in the Treatise might have contributed to Reid’s
failure to appreciate their common ground.  Taking the inputs to causal inference to be beliefs about
impressions, conscious states, has a classical foundationalist flavor.  If one follows this interpretive
lead, and further observes that Hume has no arguments on offer to ground memory or causal
inference, the skeptical reading is inevitable; Hume is a foundationalist who fails to secure
knowledge on his own terms.  As we have seen (§ 2), however, Hume admits causal inference and
memory as sources of evidence and knowledge on externalist grounds.  The Treatise’s insistence
on impressions as a starting point, to the exclusion of perception, is less a product of
foundationalism than of Hume’s aspiration to reduce perceptual knowledge itself to causal
inference.  This is a special case of an epistemic reductionism that extends to other minds,
testimony, and so forth – an imperialism of causal inference, not foundationalism.
Does the increased reliance on primitive instincts in the Enquiries reflect a desire to prune the
psychological and philosophical complexity of the Treatise, or changes in Hume’s view?  And if
changes in view, were they forced upon him?  Difficult questions.  There is no question that the
Enquiry, taken as a self-contained work, treats perception of body as primitive, thus taking a step in
the direction of Reid’s proliferation of first principles.  Perhaps these were among the features of
the work Hume had in view when, late in life, he declared the Enquiries “a compleat Answer to Dr.
Reid and to that bigoted silly Fellow, Beattie” (LDH II, 301).  Reid himself would quote
approvingly the entire paragraph of the first Enquiry where Hume attributes belief in body to
natural instinct (EIP 173).
5.  CONFLICTS WITHIN THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES
I turn to another dimension of comparison – beyond Hume’s and Reid’s attitudes toward
reductionism and psychological explanation – along which it is instructive to compare the
naturalisms of Hume and Reid.  Reid maintains that the intellectual faculties, when used properly,
do not conflict: “Common sense and reason have both one author; that Almighty author, in all
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whose other works we observe a consistency, uniformity, and beauty . . . : there must therefore be
some order and consistency in the human faculties, as well as in other parts of his workmanship”
(IHM 68).  Though this is a juncture where Reid’s providentialism guides his epistemological
construction, as with other claims about the epistemic status of first principles, he need not rely on
premises about God.  The argument can be understood as inductive: because consistency and
uniformity are observed in other parts of nature, they are to be expected in the human faculties.
The claim that the intellectual faculties do not conflict has a corollary: that the faculties, when
properly used, are co-equal or coordinate: “The first principles of every kind of reasoning are given
us by nature, and are of equal authority with the faculty of reason itself, which is also the gift of
Nature” (IHM 172).  Reid asks, again applying the consistency of the faculties to reason: “Why . .
. should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of perception; they came both out of the same
shop, and were made by the same artist . . . ?” (IHM 169).  Thus, “When Reason is properly
employed, she will confirm the documents of Nature” (IHM 202).
The claim that the faculties are consistent is of considerable importance to Reid, and in marked
contrast to Hume.  Consider the belief in secondary qualities.  Hume held that we instinctively
believe that bodies possess properties that resemble sensory experiences of color and other
secondary qualities (EHU 78n.1 – cf. THN 167, 238-39), and that this belief conflicts with
reflection (THN 226-27) – in violation of Reid’s strictures in regard to the consistency of the
faculties.  Hume has no doubt that reflection has things right.  Similarly, for Descartes, a
spontaneous impulse or inclination to believe in resembling secondary qualities conflicts with clear
and distinct perception.  Descartes of course gives the verdict to clear and distinct perception.        
The problem for Reid is to show that the conflict does not arise.  He agrees that there is no
resemblance between color experiences and the properties of objects (EIP 85-95).  Were the
unlearned more or less universally, and at a young age, to believe there is a resemblance, a conflict
among faculties would be in the offing.  Reid’s solution is to attribute to the common person a
causal or dispositional account of color: “By the constitution of our nature, we are led to . . . the
conception and belief of some unknown quality in the body, which occasions the idea”; “it is to
this quality, . . . that we give the name of colour” (IHM 86).  Because the color appearance and its
unknown cause “go together in the imagination, and are  . . . closely united,” they “are apt to be
mistaken for one and the same thing” (IHM 86-87).  The belief that color experiences resemble
properties of objects is a confused accretion to an instinctive belief.  By the lights of Descartes and
Hume, Reid needs to redescribe – to distort – the content of the common belief in color.  In a 1762
letter, Hume puts this disagreement on the record (CTR 18-19).
The case of the belief in secondary qualities is pallid compared to other conflicts between
reason and instinct Hume claims to expose.  In the first Enquiry, Hume writes not only that the
belief in external body is instinctive (EHU 151), but that it carries with it the supposition that “the
very images, presented by the senses, . . . be the external objects” (EHU 151).  Instinctively, we are
not only realists, but direct realists.  Reid welcomed these acknowledgments (EIP 173-74), but not
the developments to follow.  Hume argues that direct realism “is soon destroyed by the slightest
philosophy” (EHU 152) – the “diminishing table” argument – so that there is a conflict between
instinct and “the obvious dictates of reason” (EHU 152).  This conflict is distinctive to the
Enquiry; in the Treatise, the vulgar do not distinguish impressions and external objects (THN 193,
202).  In both the Enquiry and the Treatise, realism in any form succumbs to a Berkelian argument:
color and other secondary qualities exist only in the mind; we cannot conceive of an object
possessing extension and shape separate or abstracted from all sensible secondary qualities;
material objects are therefore impossible (THN 226-31; EHU 154-55).  Realism is “contrary to
reason” (EHU 155); there is “a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses”
(THN 231).
Though Hume nonchalantly refers to these arguments as “sceptical topic[s]” (EHU 154),
they are not “skeptical” in the way of Cartesian hypotheses: perhaps there is a deceiver; perhaps
sense-perception, or reason, is unreliable.  To the thought that our faculties might be unreliable,
Reid has his reply that “[i]f we are deceived . . . , there is no remedy” (IHM 72).  The arguments
about realism and direct realism purport to locate conflicts – antinomies – that undermine our
faculties.  One need not subscribe to a distinctive philosophical theory to want to resist these
arguments.  Still, they are at odds with Reid’s doctrine that the faculties are consistent and cannot
harbor genuine conflict.
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Let us turn to an argument distinctive to the Treatise.  In I.iv.1, “Of scepticism with regard to
reason,” Hume contends that all demonstration reduces to probability, and that all probability
reduces “to nothing, . . . utterly subvert[ing] all belief and opinion” (THN 184).  (The argument
here is distinct from the Russellian problem of induction often attributed to Hume in I.iii.6.)
Drawing on this material, Hume announces “I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can
look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another” (THN 268-69) – this,
provocatively, in I.iv.7, the conclusion of Book I.  This is an undermining argument of another sort,
purporting to show that a single faculty contains the seeds of its own destruction.  Presumably, the
consistency, uniformity, and beauty of nature applies to the internal workings of a single faculty.
Accordingly, Reid maintains that “first principles . . . will always, from the constitution of human
nature, support themselves, and gain rather than lose ground among mankind” (EIP 463).  If the
faculties support themselves, reason cannot self-destruct.  The consistency of the faculties leaves no
space either for the subversion of reason or for the Humean antinomies.
Unsurprisingly, Reid is quite exercised by Hume’s arguments for conflict and subversion.
He bemoans “the ignoble attempts of our modern sceptics to depreciate the human understanding,
and to dispirit men in the search of truth, by representing the human faculties as fit for nothing, but
to lead us into absurdities and contradictions” (IHM 77).  Reid frequently alludes to the reduction
of probability to zero in I.iv.1 and I.iv.7, where Hume professes readiness to look upon all opinions
as equally probable (IHM 3-4, 94; EIP 63, 165, 187, 450, 566).  Whereas he devotes a scant four
pages to Hume in his survey of the history of the way of ideas, much later in the Intellectual
Powers he devotes a ten page chapter to criticism of Hume’s argument that reason subverts itself.
(The first Enquiry reduces the line of development from I.iv.1 to I.iv.7 to an allusion to “the natural
weakness of human understanding”— at EHU 158.  This provides an additional sense in which
this work is an answer to Reid.  See § 4.)  Reid found the undermining arguments disfiguring, so
much so as to obscure the project he has in common with Hume – to provide a naturalistic account
of the knowledge of all animals, however reflective.
Let me offer a subsidiary speculation in regard to the import of Reid’s antipathy for the
undermining arguments.  Reid quotes Hume’s comment in I.iv.1 (THN 183) that “Nature, by an
absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel”
(EIP 571).  Similarly, he quotes the paragraph (THN 269) that follows Hume’s I.iv.7
announcement that he is “ready to reject all belief and reasoning”: “since reason is incapable of
dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical
melancholy and delirium” (EIP 562).  Reid comments: “This was surely a very kind and friendly
interposition of Nature . . . But what pity is it, that Nature . . . so kind in curing this delirium, should
be so cruel as to cause it.  Doth the same fountain send forth sweet waters and bitter?” (EIP 563).
Reid is quick to latch on to Hume’s claims of irresistibility and unavoidability in the aftermath of
the undermining argument for the subversion of belief.  Yet, there is little evidence that Reid takes
note of the numerous passages that commit Hume to the irresistibility of demonstration, memory,
and causal inference.  (See § 2.)  Bear in mind that, apart from one explicit passage in Part iv of
Book I, these claims need to be extracted from an assortment of sections in Part iii.  There is room
for the suggestion that Reid has some tendency to regard the role of irresistibility and
unavoidability in Hume as little more than an expedient to extricate us from absurdities and
contradictions, not as a component in an independently motivated naturalistic epistemology.
6.  CONFLICT AND STABILITY
Reid is also aware that Hume does not always portray instinct as a savior.  For Hume, he
notes, we are “born under a necessity of believing contradictions” (EIP 562).  Hume does construe
the Berkelian argument against realism as giving rise to a “direct and total opposition,” a
“manifest contradiction,” specifically between perceptual belief in body and causal inference (THN
231, 266).  These “two operations,” moreover, are “equally natural and necessary in the human
mind” (THN 266).  Since there is no way to “adjust those principles together,” philosophers
“successively assent to both” (THN 266).  In this context, instinctive mechanisms are a source of
seemingly ineliminable instability – part of the problem, not the solution.  This is a difficulty for the
picture of the role of irresistibility in Hume I have attributed to Reid, and also for the Kemp Smith
interpretation, in which Hume approves irresistible beliefs.  Reid writes that Hume “has shewn that
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[principles commonly received] overturn all knowledge, and at last overturn themselves, and leave
the mind in perfect suspense” (EIP 462).  This is well off the mark.  For Hume, reflection on the
antinomies and the subversion of the understanding generates instability in belief – psychological
crises, not Pyrrhonian tranquility.  (Non-human animals are immune to reflection’s conundrums,
and achieve stability on the cheap.)  The crises and their repercussions are part of the subject matter
of the science of human nature, as in the closing pages of I.iv.7.
In the Treatise, instability in our doxastic lives is one of Hume’s major preoccupations, quite
apart from the contexts where the undermining arguments are in play.  In Book I, reflection on
some belief-forming mechanisms undermines their use (§ 4).  In an important strand in Part iii of
Book I, Hume takes belief to be an infixed and hence a steady disposition (cf. THU 86, 109, 118-
19, 225, 453, 624, 626, 629).  In I.iii.9, association by relations other than cause and effect is
“fluctuating and uncertain,” and “’tis impossible it can ever operate with any considerable degree
of force and constancy” (THN 109).  In I.iv.2, conflicts with regard to the belief in body involve
“combat” (THN 205) and “struggle” between opposing principles “attack’d” by “enemies”
which seek to “destroy” (THN 215) one another.  In Book II, “Probability arises from an
opposition of contrary chances or causes, by which the mind . . . is incessantly tost from one [side]
to another . . . The imagination or understanding . . . fluctuates betwixt the opposite views” (THN
440).  In Book III, “continual fluctuation” in judgments of characters and persons gives way to
“steady and general points of view,” so that we might “arrive at a more stable judgment” (THN
581-82, Hume’s emphases).  Also in Book III, the mere fact of encountering disagreement with
others “disturb[s] the easy course of my thought,” causing “commotion” and “conflict” (THN
592, 593).  Such texts vindicate an observation of John Passmore’s in 1952: “Associationism
comes to be a special example . . . only, of a much more general principle, . . . that the mind moves
in whatever direction will bring it most ease.”
Picking up a thread in D. G. C. MacNabb, writing one year earlier, Hume assigns epistemic
pride of place to mechanisms that set us at ease and thus promote stability.  Suppose Hume
attracted to a theory of justification in this general region.  Hume had taken a step beyond Reid,
transmuting a naturalistic theory that emphasizes irresistibility and unavoidability into one that
places a premium on steadiness and stability.  Hume would have thought this step necessary to
address problems Reid raises, but leaves unresolved.  For Reid, the love of simplicity and
preference for familiar analogies are “bias[es]” or “prejudice[s]” (EIP 529) that infect the
intellectual powers, distinctively human faculties.  How are these frailties to be contained?
Consider the attention Reid gives to “The bias of human nature . . . to judge from too slight
analogies” (EIP 529).  This bias accounts for our drawing inferences “rashly” on the basis of
accidental conjunctions (IHM 41).  But which generalizations are rash?  What degrees and kinds of
similarity are admissible?  Reid’s guidance consists in admonishing Newtonian caution and
directing his readers to Bacon’s and Newton’s methodological rules (IHM 12; EIP 47-52, 76-87) –
though, as I have noted (§ 2), not to Hume’s version of these rules in I.iii.15.  This section
contributes to a broader, albeit sketchy, theory of “general rules” (THN 149 – cf. 110, 146, 173,
631-32).  In I.iii.13, Hume addresses the question of how to avoid generalizations “we rashly form
to ourselves” (THN 146), generalizations based upon “accidental” conjunctions (THN 149).
Hume’s thought is that when analogy is too slight, or based on irrelevant similarities, we are prone
to conflicting beliefs based upon different analogical arguments.  The conflicting beliefs motivate us
to form generalizations about the extent to which various kinds of analogical argument lead to
conflict.  The rash generalizations are “of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most
establish’d principles of reasonings” (THN 150); the second-order generalizations are “more
extensive and constant” (THN 149), and regulate and control cognitive biases.  Conflicts within
inductive inference thus lead to greater stability and to improved cognitive performance.
In the final sections of the Treatise and the first Enquiry, Hume ups the ante: could we
confront the undermining arguments – and the pervasive and fundamental conflicts that attend them
–, and come out on the other side, with justification intact?  In his arguments for the antinomies and
subversion of reason, Hume grossly exaggerates the conflicts to which reflection gives rise.  Reid’s
patient, detailed diagnoses of where these arguments go astray are often on target (e.g., EIP 179-83,
563-72).  Even so, Reid’s distaste for conflicts within the faculties would deprive Hume of one of
his signature styles of argument.  Hume’s project is to show that justification is tied to stability, and
that in many cases conflict generates uneasiness that motivates the identification and adoption of
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salient stabilizing devices.  The extreme problem Hume sets himself is to explain how we might
reclaim stability and justification even in the face of the undermining arguments.
One set of interpretive options, especially well-suited to the Treatise, exploits Hume’s
insistence that intense reflection cannot be sustained (THN 183, 187, 218, 269).  Reid notices these
sorts of passages and construes them as ad hoc, an admission of epistemological failure (§ 5).  We
may suppose instead that, for Hume, justification is relative to stability within a time frame;
justification collapses during the short periods of intense reflection, but is otherwise preserved.
Alternatively, perhaps mechanisms are justifying if they are conducive to sufficient average stability
in belief over time.  Intense reflection lowers the overall average, but not below the threshold of
stability required for justification.  Either way, the intense reflection that generates the undermining
arguments, though an epistemic negative, leaves sufficient stability in place to sustain the science of
man.
A second approach emerges most clearly in the first Enquiry, and is of special interest in the
context of Reid.  Michael Williams has developed the reading, which derives from Passmore, in an
especially compelling form.  The interpretation takes its cue from Hume’s suggestion that
skepticism serves a stabilizing function insofar as it tempers or moderates the excesses of
superstition (EHU 161-62).  Exposure to the “sceptical topic[s]” is thus a net epistemic plus.
Reid agrees that the love of simplicity and familiar analogies are “apt to lead us wrong” (EIP 528)
– often taking us in the direction of extravagant “hypotheses and systems” (IHM 41).  He and
Hume share the Newtonian objective of reigning in judgments that do not adhere closely to “daily .
. . experience” (EHU 162; cf. IHM 125 and EIP 49, 535).  How can we achieve the “proper
regulation and restraint” (EIP 528) in our reasoning?  Hume offers a prescription: though intense
reflection gives rise to crises that are temporarily destabilizing, in the longer term “a small tincture
of Pyrrhonism” (EHU 161) restrains the imagination from “running, without control” (EHU
162).  Our faculties lead us into contradictions, but are not “fit for nothing”; the undermining
arguments Reid abhors serve a virtuous psychological and epistemic function.  That Hume would
offer this speculation is another symptom of the centrality of stability in his philosophy.
Louis E. Loeb
 I am indebted to Matthew Davidson (San Bernadino), whose questions about an earlier paper
prompted me to consider the present topic.  Thanks also to Stephen Darwall and Frederick Schmitt
(Indiana) for help and encouragement, and to Erica Lucast for superb assistance verifying selected
references and quotations.
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